

C0781/QIC 890 Lec 04, Sept 20, 2016

3 further comments on TP, qbits & nonsignaling:

① Connection between TP & quantum encryption & Enc

② An example of "non-composable-qbit":

remote state preparation

③ Beyond QM


References =

① Ambainis-Mosca-Tapp-de-Wolf 2000, Boykin-Raychowdhury 00,
Leung-Shor 2002

② Lo 99, Bennett-DiVincenzo-Shor-Smolin-Terlet-Woatters 00,
Deretak 01, Leung-Shor 02, Bennett-Hayden-Leung-Shor-Winter 03

Connection between TP & QEnc :

Recall TP:



By evaluating Bob's state before receiving x :

$$\frac{I}{2} = \frac{1}{4} \sum_x \delta_x p \delta_x^+$$

\uparrow Half of $|E\rangle$ \uparrow prob of each x State conditioned on message = x .

This gives an encryption scheme QEnc:


Alice and Bob share a secret key x ,

$$\forall x \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}, \quad \text{pr}(x) = \frac{1}{4}$$

Alice applies δ_x to p

She transmits $\delta_x p \delta_x^+$ to Bob.


Bob decodes by inverting δ_x .



An eavesdropper without knowledge of x sees $S(p) = \frac{1}{4} \sum_x \delta_x p \delta_x^+ = \frac{I}{2}$


that is independent of p .

- Consider generalized teleportation (using entanglement & cbits to achieve qbits):



(NB = meas indep of ρ)
 $(A, B: d'-dim)$
 $(\rho: d \text{ dim}, d \leq d')$
 $\leftarrow \text{part of } |\psi\rangle_{RA_i}$

- Consider generalized encryption (using secret key & qbits to achieve private q-comm):



Alice & Bob share a key K where $P_K = \text{prob}(K=k)$.

To communicate ρ to Bob:

Alice applies E_k and sends $E_k(\rho)$ to Bob, and

Bob applies $Disc$ to retrieve ρ , such that:

- $\forall k \quad Disc E_k = I$ (correctness)
- $R(\rho) := \sum_k P_k E_k(\rho) = \rho_0$ (indep of ρ)
what Eve can see without knowing k

eg. $E_k(\rho) = \sigma_k \rho \sigma_k^\dagger, \rho_0 = \frac{I}{2}$.

Natural correspondences:

Generalized teleportation:

Measurement outcome z
Sent via q bits

Bob's half of ent state

Bob's state upon receiving z
for

Generalized q-encryption:

Key k
pre-shared secret

The state being eavesdropped


The state transmitted knowing k .
E.g. $E_k(p)$.

- Consider exact schemes (will return to this issue).

Thm 1: given any generalized teleportation protocol \mathcal{TP}' for transmitting any d -dim ρ state using an entangled state $|\Psi\rangle$ with local dim d' and transmitting a message $x \in \{1, 2, \dots, m\}$, there is an encryption scheme $(\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ using a key $K \in \{1, 2, \dots, m\}$ and $\log d'$ qubits.

Pf: We need to find \mathcal{E}_K for the encryption scheme:


A tempting idea that doesn't work:




Problem: Alice cannot control the outcome x , and that is NOT her key shared with Bob.

Idea that works:

Consider Bob's decoding operation in the given \mathcal{TP}' :



Using the isometric extension of D_x , \exists unitary U_{xc}
 \exists state μ_{xc} s.t.




Furthermore, output = $f \otimes \mu_{xc}$ in a product state
 with μ_{xc} independent of f (otherwise, TP'
 would not have transmitted f perfectly).

So this gives an encryption scheme where:

- $\Pr(K=k) = p_k = \text{prob of getting outcome } k \text{ in TP'}$.

- $E_k(f) = \text{Tr}_2 U_{xc}^\dagger (f \otimes \mu_{xc}) U_{xc}$

d' dim
 \uparrow
 p_k



\uparrow
 m such values
 suffice $\Rightarrow \log m$ kubits

Then $D_k E_k(f) = f$ by correctness of TP'.

- $\sum_k p_k E_k(f) = \text{Tr}_A (|K\rangle\langle K|) = p_0$ indep of f .

Thm 2: given any generalized encryption scheme \mathcal{E}_k encrypting a d -dim sys to an average state ρ_0 , using a key $k \in \{1, 2, \dots, m\}$, there is a generalized teleportation protocol \mathcal{T}_k using $\log m$ cbits and $\log d$ ebits to achieve $\log d$ qbits.

Pf (see quant-ph/0201008 for $\rho_0 = \frac{I}{d}$, PRL vol 90 127905, 2003 for general ρ_0).
 Here we prove for the simpler case: $d=d'$, $\rho_0 = \frac{I}{d}$.

$$\mathcal{E}_k(\psi) = U_k \psi U_k^\dagger, \quad \mathcal{D}_k(\psi) = U_k^\dagger \psi U_k$$

$$R(\psi) = \sum_k p_k U_k \psi U_k^\dagger = \frac{I}{d}, \quad \forall \psi \in \mathcal{B}(\mathbb{C}^d)$$

Claim: Let $|\Phi_d\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} |i\rangle |i\rangle$


Almost a meas
 along $|\Phi_d\rangle \otimes I |\Phi_d\rangle$
 Replaces the
 Bell measurement

$$\text{Let } M_k = U_k^\dagger \otimes I |\Phi_d\rangle \langle \Phi_d| U_k \otimes I p_k d^2$$

Then: ① $\{M_k\}_{k=1}^m$ is a POVM in $\mathcal{B}(\mathbb{C}^d \otimes \mathbb{C}^d)$

(corresponding to some meas M on 2 d -dim sys)

② \mathcal{T}_k defined as



Transmits $\log d$ qbits from A' to B'

Pf ①: for each k , clearly $M_k \geq 0$.

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_k M_k &= \left(\sum_k p_k U_k^\dagger \otimes I \left(\mathbb{F}_d \otimes \mathbb{F}_d \right) U_k \otimes I \right) d^2 \\ &= R \otimes I \left(\mathbb{F}_d \otimes \mathbb{F}_d \right) \cdot d^2 \quad \leftarrow \text{uses properties of the exact randomizing map} \\ &= \left(\frac{I}{d} \otimes \frac{I}{d} \right) d^2 = I \otimes I \end{aligned}$$

$\therefore \{M_k\}$ is a POVM.

② Let ρ be the state in A'

$p_k \dots \dots \dots$ in B if measurement outcome is k .

$$\text{Then } p_k p_k = \text{Tr}_{A'A} \left[M_k \otimes I_B \left(\rho \otimes \left(\mathbb{F}_d \otimes \mathbb{F}_d \right) \right) \right]$$

$$= p_k d^2 \text{Tr}_{A'A} \left(\left(U_k^\dagger \otimes I_A \left(\mathbb{F}_d \otimes \mathbb{F}_d \right) U_k \otimes I_A \right) \otimes I_B \right) \left(\rho \otimes \left(\mathbb{F}_d \otimes \mathbb{F}_d \right) \right)$$

$$\stackrel{\text{lemma}}{=} p_k d^2 \text{Tr}_{A'A} \left(\left(\mathbb{F}_d \otimes \mathbb{F}_d \right)_{A'A} \otimes I_B \right) \left(\left(U_k \rho U_k^\dagger \right)_{A'} \otimes \left(\mathbb{F}_d \otimes \mathbb{F}_d \right)_{AB} \right)$$

\uparrow
no correction outcome in TP.
 \uparrow
new input

$$\stackrel{\text{TP}}{=} p_k d^2 \cdot \frac{1}{d^2} \left(U_k \rho U_k^\dagger \right)_B \quad \left(\text{Alternative pf} = \text{write } \mathbb{F}_d \otimes \mathbb{F}_d = \sum_{i,j} |i\rangle\langle i| \otimes |j\rangle\langle j| \right)$$

$$= p_k \left(U_k \rho U_k^\dagger \right)_B$$

$\therefore \text{prob}(k) = p_k$, conditioned on outcome k .

Bob has U_k & U_k^\dagger . So applying U_k^\dagger returns the correct state ρ

$$\text{Lemma} = \text{tr}_1 \left(N_1 \otimes I_2 \right) (Y_{12}) = \text{tr}_1 (Y_{12}) (N_1 \otimes I_2)$$

Pf: by linearity, it suffices to check

for $N_1 = |i\rangle\langle j|$ and $Y_{12} = |k\rangle\langle l| \otimes |m\rangle\langle n|$

$$\text{LHS} = \text{tr}_2 \left(|i\rangle\langle j| |k\rangle\langle l| \right) \otimes |m\rangle\langle n| = \delta_{jk} \delta_{il} |m\rangle\langle n|$$

$$\text{RHS} = \text{tr}_1 \left(|k\rangle\langle l| |i\rangle\langle j| \right) \otimes |m\rangle\langle n| = \delta_{jk} \delta_{il} |m\rangle\langle n|$$

\therefore Lemma holds $\forall N, Y$.

Cor: to encrypt a d -dim quantum sys (with average $\frac{F}{d}$)

the key has to take d^2 values

Taking into account data compression (next topic)

$2 \log d$ key bits are needed.

NB: $\log d$ key bits are necessary and sufficient for encrypting a d -state classical message.

Pf (cor): from thm 2, if, by contradiction, there is an encryption scheme with fewer than d^2 key states then, we can transmit $\log d$ qbits using fewer than $2 \log d$ cbits, contradicting optimality of generalized teleportation.

There is a 1-1 correspondence between

NB: Thms 1-2 show that generalized teleportation & generalized quantum encryption.